Dissertation: “Regimes of Pluralism: Tolerance Beyond Liberal Democracy”

My dissertation research is guided by the following questions: Can religious pluralism be sustained in regimes that are not liberal democracies? What conditions allow these regimes to sustain religious pluralism? What forms can religious pluralism take in theory and in practice, and how do the particularities of regime type shape the form of pluralism practiced? Finally, how should we understand the relationship between religious pluralism and other related concepts such as toleration, peaceful co-existence, and harmony?

Drawing on a reading of Montesquieu, and a comparative analysis of the practice of pluralism in ancient Rome and Singapore, I argue that religious pluralism can be maintained in some regimes that are not understood to be liberal democracies. I show that such regimes have developed pluralist justifications and practices adapted to the particular exigencies of their societies. This conceptualization of pluralism allows us to gain a firmer grip on this essential idea and to see that regimes that do not fit neatly into the category of liberal democracy can be appropriate candidates for pluralism and toleration.

Under Revision

  • “Civil Religion and Political Freedom in Rousseau’s Social Contract” – Invited to revise and resubmit at The Review of Politics

Rousseau’s civil religion in the Social Contract has been interpreted as either an authoritarian institution that reinforces the collectivist ideal of the Social Contract or as a non-coercive proposal aimed at promoting toleration. This article offers an alternative account of civil religion that emphasizes popular sovereignty as both the source and object of civil religion. On this reading, civil religion is a democratic choice by a sovereign people on the kind of beliefs and behavior they want to collectively endorse and expect from each other. When established by the people, civil religion serves the higher function of exemplifying and preserving political freedom in a political community. Recognizing the popular roots of civil religion helps us to understand civil religion as an essential condition for maintaining the body politic that Rousseau envisions in the Social Contract and an important component of his democratic thought.

Working Papers 

  • “Montesquieu’s Religious Particularism: A Regime-Specific Account of Pluralism” (adapted from a dissertation chapter)

Montesquieu’s stance on religion has been interpreted in two ways: he was either a critic of revealed religion in a manner typical of the Enlightenment, or a proponent of religious toleration. Those who read Montesquieu as a defender of religious toleration emphasize his belief in the social and political utility of religion. In this article, however, I argue that Montesquieu’s argument for toleration should be understood in relation to distinct aspects of his political thought presented in The Spirit of the Laws, namely, his political particularism and regime pluralism. This allows us to read Montesquieu as providing an account of religious pluralism and toleration that is sensitive to differences in regime type. Just as the laws and institutions of a state must fit the specific characteristics of a nation and its people, a country’s approach towards religious pluralism might also have to be adapted to the particularities of its regime.

  • “Toleration and Dissent: John Locke on The Status of Hats, Turbans, and Cloaks”

This paper analyzes the connection between two positions that John Locke presents separately regarding the status of religious dress and its potential danger to civic peace. In his Essay Concerning Toleration, Locke asserts that religious groups with distinctive attire are politically dangerous as they are latent factions whose members can be easily identified and mobilized. He thus defends the state’s right to weaken such groups, if they are growing in numbers and hold dissenting opinions. Later, in his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argues that religious groups with strong ingroup identification do not in fact pose a threat and should be tolerated, if their distinctive form of worship—including dress— is not in itself unlawful in private. In this paper, I examine the underlying affinities and differences between these positions. I argue that Locke’s change of position was a theoretical necessity that reflects the inherent tension between the principled account of toleration that he wishes to establish, and his recognition that the practice of toleration ultimately requires the magistrate’s judgment and discretion. 

Translation

  • French to English translation for “Montesquieu and the Classical World” by Catherine Larrère, chapter in The Cambridge Companion to Montesquieu, edited by Keegan Callanan and Sharon Krause, 76–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.