Dissertation & Book Project: “Regimes of Pluralism: Tolerance Beyond Liberal Democracy”

Toleration has been viewed as a liberal-democratic value and a practice that is unique to liberal democracies. Can religious pluralism be sustained in regimes that are not liberal democracies? If so, how and of what kind? How should we understand the concept and practice of pluralism in relation to the concept of toleration?

My dissertation showed that religious pluralism can be sustained in some regimes that are not considered liberal democracies. Through a reading of Montesquieu, and an analysis of the forms of pluralism sustained in two different kinds of pluralistic regimes outside of the liberal-democratic order (imperial Rome and Singapore), I showed that these regimes developed pluralist justifications and practices adapted to the particular exigencies of their societies. By including regimes that do not fit neatly into the category of liberal democracy as appropriate candidates in our study of pluralism, we can broaden our understanding of this important idea and gain new insights into managing religious diversity in contemporary pluralistic societies beyond advocating a policy of toleration.

I am currently preparing my book manuscript, which builds on my dissertation research.

Under Revision

  • “Civil Religion and Political Freedom in Rousseau’s Social Contract” – Revised and resubmitted at The Review of Politics

Rousseau’s civil religion in the Social Contract has been interpreted as either an authoritarian institution that reinforces the collectivist ideal of the Social Contract or as a non-coercive proposal aimed at promoting toleration. This article offers an alternative account of civil religion that emphasizes popular sovereignty as both the source and object of civil religion. On this reading, civil religion is a democratic choice by a sovereign people on the kind of beliefs and behavior they want to collectively endorse and expect from each other. When established by the people, civil religion serves the higher function of exemplifying and preserving political freedom in a political community. Recognizing the popular roots of civil religion helps us to understand civil religion as an essential condition for maintaining the body politic that Rousseau envisions in the Social Contract and an important component of his democratic thought.

Working Papers 

  • “Montesquieu’s Religious Particularism: A Regime-Specific Account of Pluralism” (adapted from a dissertation chapter)

Montesquieu’s stance on religion has been interpreted in two ways: he was either a critic of revealed religion in a manner typical of the Enlightenment, or a proponent of religious toleration. Those who read Montesquieu as a defender of religious toleration emphasize his belief in the social and political utility of religion. In this article, however, I argue that Montesquieu’s argument for toleration should be understood in relation to distinct aspects of his political thought presented in The Spirit of the Laws, namely, his political particularism and regime pluralism. This allows us to read Montesquieu as providing an account of religious pluralism and toleration that is sensitive to differences in regime type. Just as the laws and institutions of a state must fit the specific characteristics of a nation and its people, a country’s approach towards religious pluralism might also have to be adapted to the particularities of its regime.

  • “Toleration and Dissent: John Locke on The Status of Hats, Turbans, and Cloaks”

This paper analyzes the connection between two positions that John Locke presents separately regarding the status of religious dress and its potential danger to civic peace. In his Essay Concerning Toleration, Locke asserts that religious groups with distinctive attire are politically dangerous as they are latent factions whose members can be easily identified and mobilized. He thus defends the state’s right to weaken such groups, if they are growing in numbers and hold dissenting opinions. Later, in his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argues that religious groups with strong ingroup identification do not in fact pose a threat and should be tolerated, if their distinctive form of worship—including dress— is not in itself unlawful in private. In this paper, I examine the underlying affinities and differences between these positions. I argue that Locke’s change of position was a theoretical necessity that reflects the inherent tension between the principled account of toleration that he wishes to establish, and his recognition that the practice of toleration ultimately requires the magistrate’s judgment and discretion. 

Translation

  • French to English translation for “Montesquieu and the Classical World” by Catherine Larrère, chapter in The Cambridge Companion to Montesquieu, edited by Keegan Callanan and Sharon Krause, 76–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.